The Kremlin is “testing” NATO. Former Intelligence Agency officer on Russia’s strategy of chaos
Drones, shipments, arson and seemingly innocent photos plus a coordinated online narrative. This is what today, according to Lt. Col. Marcin Faliński, is the range of activities with which the Kremlin is “testing” NATO countries and stoking fear without open confrontation. A former officer of the Foreign Intelligence Agency talks about the consequences of this tactic and how to defend against it in an interview on the YouTube channel “Momenty”.
– Drones in the Danish straits, we see planes flying in Estonian airspace over our naval platform. I think it will be different tests. It will be either drones, or packages, or arson, or photos. This is all happening, of course, with an appropriate media narrative, because it is a connected system. They add appropriate comments, bots hit the right notes, troll farms do their thing and so on – says Lt. Col. Marcin Faliński.
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In the opinion of a former Intelligence Agency officer, this mixture of “hard” incidents and soft manipulation of information has one goal: to create a sense of disorientation and helplessness. Then it is easier to panic and put pressure on decision-makers, even if a real military threat does not materialize immediately. Operations “at the interface” of visibility, partly in the air, partly in logistics, partly in the infosphere, make up a broader, methodical strategy.
Don’t fall into “spying”. The role of citizens in security
– We are still on the threshold of kinetic conflict, but it is constantly leading to chaos. (…) When drones entered Poland, there were already such stories – information was shared on the Internet that Zamość was literally on fire. If we add that, for example, they turn off the Internet in the Zamość region, turn off the television, and, God forbid, attack the waterworks, let’s imagine: we want to contact someone from Zamość from Warsaw – we can’t; and he says that there is no contact and no water, and on the Internet they say that we were attacked. Let’s imagine the chaos and what is happening – notes Faliński.
Therefore, as the former officer emphasizes, information resilience and a cool head are needed, also on the part of citizens.
Too much zeal in looking out for “spies” can be as harmful as indifference. Faliński warns not to create a spiral of suspicion towards anyone who takes photos of the infrastructure or hangs around the station.
– I would recommend caution so that we do not fall into espionage, because it always works to the advantage of the enemy, i.e. chaos – he says.
Gaps in the protection of Polish critical infrastructure and logistics
However, there are real gaps in the background. The interlocutor points to examples from recent months – from incidents at waterworks to “night amber hunters” – which, in his opinion, show that some services still do not have sufficient counterintelligence habits and “second-line” procedures for checking sensitive cases.. His diagnosis is simple: training, awareness and constant audit, but also wise use of technology.
– Also anticipatory activities, i.e. obtaining information or analyzing information by – as I mentioned – using artificial intelligence tools to analyze senders to perform segregation, just as the border guard always has a second line: everyone passes, and people who are more suspicious or seem suspicious are subject to more detailed control. Perhaps such solutions would be appropriate – says Faliński about inspections of parcels arriving in Poland from abroad.
State and business. A joint response to hybrid operations
In everyday life, Russians – says Faliński – play broadly and long-term: they invest in polarizing environments, nest narratives in thematic groups and “press” content into the least obvious segments of the network.. This, in turn, forces the state to cooperate with the private sector: courier and airline companies, infrastructure operators and social media, so as to filter anomalies more quickly and not look at everything through the prism of a “false flag” or mutual accusations of “Russian disinformation”.
Prescription? Less show off, more work. On the institutional side – mandatory counterintelligence training for uniformed services and employees of sensitive sectors; on the side of society – information first aid course: verify sources, do not continue to share sensational “instruments”, report disturbing events, but do not become a self-proclaimed tracker. Wherever it is reasonable and legal: machines and algorithms that will capture what humans cannot sift in real time.
In a world where virality replaces credibility and a drone can be as dangerous as a rumor, the only permanent advantage is competence: technical, organizational and civic.
