Prof. Sankowski: universities must be competitive. 3% for science, 100% for Poland

The classic theory of human capital developed in the mid-20th century by, among others, Gary Becker (Nobel Prize winner in economics in 1992) assumed that education increases the knowledge and productivity of graduates. Better education, however, translates directly into higher salary. This theory was questioned by later work by economists, and the true mechanics of the labor market were demonstrated by Michael Spence (Nobel Prize winner in economics in 2001), who introduced the revolutionary signaling theory.

Labor market and employee skills

The modern labor market operates in conditions of enormous information asymmetry, i.e. employers do not directly know the competencies of candidates, and young people when choosing studies do not know what competencies will be needed on the market in a few years. This asymmetry has recently been further increased due to the presence of generative artificial intelligence, which is leading to an unprecedented transformation in the labor market. During the recruitment process, the employer is often unable to measure the candidate’s intelligence, work ethic or adaptability. One must often have limited confidence in his own declarations. Since HR managers do not have direct access to an employee’s hidden potential, they must rely on other hard indicators. As Spence proved in his works, it is the diploma of an elite, demanding university that serves as an important market signal. For the employer, a university diploma becomes a credible proof of the most desirable hidden competences, i.e. that he worked hard during them, and for the employee it is a signal that he is able to learn new skills that are currently needed.

Good education

It leads to a very important conclusion: elite universities function in the modern economy as sophisticated filtering institutions. Candidate selection processes at the entrance, high adaptation requirements during studies and the intellectual costs of surviving the entire process communicate a signal of quality to the outside world, which reduces costs in recruitment processes and makes it much easier. In the era of increasing globalization of talent turnover, this mechanism is gaining unprecedented importance. For a recruiter working under the efficiency pressure of the recruitment market, a diploma obtained from a highly elite university that requires constant effort is no longer just a sign that the student “he passed his final exams well“. Instead, it is, referring to Michael Spence’s theory, the ultimate signal that he has outstanding adaptability and critical thinking skills that will allow him to become a manager of LLM agents, not their victim. The world’s best universities are not those that force knowledge that will become obsolete in six months into the heads of students, but incubators that send a message that their graduates have the ability to work in an environment of constant challenges, where every six months they have to pass an exam requiring new skills.

Knowledge about signaling theory would be incomplete if we did not relate its mechanisms to the current revolution on the global labor market driven by the widespread commercialization of artificial intelligence. Unlike previous waves of economic automation, which primarily eliminated repetitive physical positions and routine production work, the current algorithmic wave of AI directly affects the so-called knowledge workers. This poses a dramatic challenge for fresh university graduates making their debut in a highly competitive market. We observe that, as artificial intelligence algorithms acquire more and more autonomy, the least substantively prepared and least experienced employees become the element most susceptible to substitution.

Artificial intelligence support

Despite the reduction of entry-level positions, the total number of newly created positions supported by AI continues to grow worldwide. The job market for entry-level employees is shrinking, and at the same time, companies are looking for experienced people to supervise artificial intelligence systems. They do not want to waste time or resources on verifying candidates from average universities. Spence’s signaling theory will play an increasingly important role in practice: in highly demanding recruitment processes, a diploma from a leading university becomes the only reliable indicator for the employer that guarantees the candidate’s intellectual quality and adaptability, which effectively reduces the risk of recruitment error.

Moreover, widespread access to AI tools reduces the value of diplomas from weaker universities. If tasks during studies can be solved by algorithms, the diploma itself ceases to prove intelligence and hard work. As a result, the market is divided. The value of diplomas from the best centers, such as MIT, Stanford and Oxford, will increase. Moreover, remote work and the development of the technology sector have blurred national borders. Polish graduates today compete on the global market directly with candidates from Silicon Valley, Zurich and London. If Poland does not build strong academic centers, our specialists will lose in this race.

Quality of graduates

The conclusion is simple: building recognizable research institutions in the field of technology is a condition for survival in the competition for innovation, not a matter of prestige. For foreign companies, the names of Polish universities are unknown. They evaluate markets through the prism of international rankings in which our universities fare poorly. This lack of a strong brand works to our detriment. A weak market signal directly affects the foreign careers and earnings of our graduates. Additionally, the development of AI requires us to change the education model. Since AI systems automate the work of juniors, universities should focus on educating experts within doctoral schools. Such studies must be attractive to attract the most talented people in the country. The quality of PhD graduates must send a clear signal to global companies. Today, technology corporations often do not open research centers in our country because they lack experts with PhDs on site, and our universities are too low in the rankings. In the AI ​​industry, the success of a company is not determined by labor costs, but by the time it takes to hire the right specialists. Therefore, we need to quickly increase the number of trained researchers and experts in fields such as data science.

Science needs support

In this globalizing technological labor market, and with growing tensions related to the increasing availability of generative AI, where quality signaling will play a key role, the demands made by the 3%science campaign appear as minimal and basic requirements that simply must be met for Poland to find its place in this new geoeconomic reality. The second postulate is particularly important “Stable and decent conditions for students and doctoral students“it is these people who will determine the technological sovereignty of our economy, as well as the structure and technological advantage of companies operating in Poland. In fact, we should have been planning a long time ago how to make our universities competitive on global labor markets and increase their international rankings; without this, Poland will not be able to send a signal to the world that it counts in any way in the race for new technologies.