Agent in the Polish ministry. Lt. Col. Korowaj: It’s a failure of verification, but a success of counterintelligence

Ppłk rez. Maciej Korowaj

A spy detained in the heart of the Ministry of National Defense. He has worked in the ministry since the 1990s. In 2021, the Military Counterintelligence Service subjected him to a screening procedure, but at that time the officers did not see any evidence of betrayal. – The ability to clean one’s own environment proves the strength and effectiveness of the system – says Reservist Lt. Col. Maciej Korowaj in “Rozmowa Wprost”.

This situation calls into question the effectiveness of verification mechanisms, but at the same time shows that the operational department is able to correct previous shortcomings.

Reserve Lt. Col. Maciej Korowaj, a military analyst and former officer of the Military Intelligence Service, in an interview with “Wprost” spares no bitter words about the procedures, noting that in this case: “We can speak of a failure of the system for preventing and verifying people in such positions.”

However, the expert emphasizes that there are two sides to the coin. On the one hand, the system failed at the stage of checking documents, but on the other: “This should be considered a success of the counterintelligence operational department, which is not only waiting for information, but is actively checking various possibilities.” According to the lieutenant colonel, it was thanks to operational activities that it was possible to finally develop a mechanism that allowed for the effective identification of the agent in the structures of the Ministry of National Defense.

Has the detained Ministry of National Defense official worked for foreign intelligence since the 1990s?

Whole conversation:

Many questions arise as to how a person suspected of collaborating with a foreign power managed to avoid exposure for so long. The detainee, now 60 years old, was an official with extensive experience.

Lt. Col. Korowaj explains that keeping an agent in the counterintelligence regime for decades is an extremely difficult and expensive task for each service. Russian or Belarusian intelligence often uses the strategy of placing its sources in the so-called “shadow”, in third-tier positions. Such people are not conspicuous and do not always undergo the most rigorous, “meticulous” verification cycle, which is reserved for the most important functions in the state. With a huge number of officials, data verification is not always carried out to its full extent, which creates loopholes that the adversary ruthlessly exploits.

Detention of a spy at the Ministry of National Defense. Behind the scenes of the blunder

The behind-the-scenes of the spy’s mishap are extremely interesting. According to media reports, the official was to be identified after going on holiday in Belarus, from where he could not return due to closed borders. In an act of desperation, he sent a message to his employer, which immediately aroused the alert of the services. Does this prove the incompetence of foreign intelligence? Lt. Col. Korowaj points out that the current geopolitical situation forces the services to take greater risks. Consulate closures and difficulties with secure internet connectivity mean that face-to-face contact is sometimes necessary.

– The services took a risk, hoping that his movements towards the eastern border would go unnoticed. It was their mistake and they lost their agent, says Lt. Col. Korowaj.

What motivated the spy detained at the Ministry of National Defense?

The motivation of people who decide to betray their homeland is rarely ideological. In the case of a civilian employee of the Ministry of National Defense, the key factor could simply be money, because their earnings often fluctuate around the national average or even below this level.

As the expert explains, the mercantile factor is often accompanied by frustration, a feeling of being unappreciated or strong political polarization. The ideal agent is one who is practically unnoticeable on a daily basis and does not stand out in any particular way in his behavior. However, even the best prepared “sleeper” agents make intelligence errors related to financing or careless behavior, which ultimately lead counterintelligence to their trail.

Agent at the Ministry of National Defense. What did he gain for foreign intelligence?

Although it is difficult to determine precisely what documents could have been sent to Moscow or Minsk without knowing the official’s specific competences, his operational position was considered excellent. Over the years of working in the Department of Defense Strategy and Planning, he has accumulated a huge background knowledge, knowing the structure of the ministry from logistics to personnel relations.

In “Rozmowa Wprost”, the lieutenant colonel explains that eastern intelligence is primarily interested in our determination to build our armed forces and readiness to support allies on NATO’s eastern flank, where Poland plays the role of a strategic “security hinge”.

Will Poland lose the eyes of its allies because of a spy in the ministry?

Despite the seriousness of the situation, Lt. Col. Korowaj reassures us about relations with our allies. The fact that the spy has been operating in the structures since the 1990s does not necessarily mean that he has lost the trust of NATO partners.

The expert argues that: “The ability to clean your own environment proves the strength and effectiveness of the system.” Similar cases also occurred in the American services, which only confirms that a given structure is important to the enemy and worth infiltrating. The final elimination of the threat, even after many years, should be treated as proof that the Polish services, despite imperfect procedures, can effectively protect the interests of the state.

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